Source: Published in “The Party Room” Summer 2009
The current global financial crisis serves once again to underscore the point that in an increasingly interconnected 24/7 world, no country, including Australia, can escape the impact of the powerful forces that are now reshaping the international community. Before the crisis occurred the international system was already going through a period of profound change, one that was laying the foundations of a new global order. Recent events are likely to reinforce the impact of this change, creating further strategic upheaval, undermining economic prosperity and generating increased insecurity for states and communities.
Australia’s own future prosperity and security will be heavily dependent on the way it responds to the changes now buffeting the international system. This reflects an enduring truth about Australia’s international relations. From the earliest years of white settlement at the end of the 18th century, international events have shaped Australia’s destiny and little has changed to alter this reality: Australia is a country where short and long-term national interests are bound up with the character of the global order.
Contrary to the pessimism that sometimes surrounds the debate over Australia’s international future, we have many national assets that should assist us to retain relative prosperity and remain secure, in a world of profound change. In this respect, Australia is not an insignificant country and as former foreign minister Alexander Downer once pointed out, in relative terms, Australia’s capacity for influence should not be dismissed or undervalued.
Among other things, Australia has the world’s 12th largest economy (9th in GDP per capita), sustaining (until recently) high levels of growth over a long period of time and well integrated into the global economy; a strong resource and energy base; a well educated population with a high standard of living, securely integrated into a generally harmonious multicultural society; a strong tradition of creativity in the arts and of innovation in the sciences and technology; a small, but outstandingly competent, well-equipped and well-trained defence force; a highly professional foreign service with an extensive network of posts and missions around the world; a global network of well-developed international alliances and diplomatic partnerships, and a stable liberal democratic political system with strong institutions of governance.
The challenge for the Rudd government, as it was for the Howard government, is to optimise these strengths in an era of tumult and turmoil. Clearly the Rudd government has had trouble meeting this challenge. Not only has its response to the current financial crisis been unconvincing, and at times ill-conceived, its management of Australia’s wider foreign policy agenda has been unsteady and at times simply incompetent.
The list of its failures begins with the mismanagement of Australia’s relations with some of our most important friends in Asia, notably Japan and India, runs through the poorly developed idea for an Asia-Pacific Community, and lights, among other things, on the mismanagement of the budget and diplomatic resources of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. It is almost certain that without a clearer understanding of Australia’s national interests and a commitment to pursue them in a more disciplined, coherent and organised way, the Rudd government will continue to struggle with its foreign policy.
As I remarked in my policy paper, the Emerging Global Order published by the Lowy Institute for International Policy in March this year, Australia’s interests will be best served if it pursues a strategy of selective global activism. This places Australia’s national interests at the core of our foreign policy and requires the government to pay close attention to each of its key elements.
First, Australia must sustain the attributes of its hard and soft power. These are the source of its credibility, influence and legitimacy in the international arena and they rest essentially on the maintenance of a strong, resilient and competitive economy able to take advantage of the opportunities of globalisation and the closely integrated in to the dynamism of the Asia Pacific.
Second, it will need to be clear-eyed about its national interests and the way they can be pursued effectively in a world of dynamic change. This will require a holistic approach to the conceptualisation of interests, and close alignment between the purpose of policy and the means to carry it out. It will almost certainly require that we give a high priority to our policy objectives in the Asia Pacific.
Third, Australia will have to maintain an active diplomatic and economic presence on the world stage. It will need to invest additional resources in traditional diplomacy through the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and ready to deploy military force in defence of compelling national interests when required. Critically, however, Australia’s activism will require selectivity in the tasks it undertakes.
Fourth, while maintaining a credible military capability, Australia will need to be conscious of its limitations as an instrument of policy. These limitations are inherent in the nature of military force itself, are a function of Australia’s particular ability to wield it and a reflection of the changing nature of contemporary international affairs.
Fifth, Australia will need to maintain its existing alliances and strategic relationships and develop opportunities for fresh partnerships as the occasions arise. In relation to the US alliance, in particular, Australia will need to be alert to the international forces that could undermine the strength of alliance, but also conscious of the dictum that alliances are less reflections of states’ identities of interests than their complementarities of interest.
Sixth, Australia will need to enhance its mechanisms for policy making in the general area of national security. It will need to develop and sustain a wider range of foreign policy capabilities – diplomatic, military and economic, that fuse bilateralism with multilateralism, that draw on the whole of government, and that are innovative and adapted to the unique challenges of contemporary international affairs.
Finally, as with all sound and effective foreign policy, Australia will have to ensure the policies it pursues internationally rest securely on the values and beliefs of the Australian community, that it projects those liberal democratic values through its foreign policy and that overall, the policy commands the support of the Australian people.