Address to Conference on The Afghanistan Conflict: Australia's Role
The Australian National University
23 October 2009
Thank you for that generous introduction Professor Danspeckgruber. When Professor Saikal asked me to come and speak at this conference, I quickly said I would be delighted to do so, and I thank you Amin for thinking of me.
One of the few things I did as an academic that related to Afghanistan was to publish a book in 1985 entitled, The Indian Ocean: Perspectives on a Strategic Arena. I went back to the bookto prepare this paper. In the chapter on Afghanistan, there is this passage:
Several factors will play critical roles in determining whether the Soviet Union succeeds in …neutralising the Afghans. These include the policies adopted by Pakistan towards the insurgents, the extent of external support…, the success or failure of Soviet attempts to convert divisions among the insurgents into open conflict, the Soviets ability to establish a government in Kabul that commands a large armed force and has a wide base of support and the scope and duration of the Soviet commitment.
That passage was written about a different time in Afghanistan's history by a much younger, but perhaps no less wise, Zalmay Khalizad. He, as you will know, has since gone on to greater things, including serving a term as the US Ambassador to Afghanistan. His comments remind us that in this conflict some things don't change all that much. Substitute the US for the Soviet Union and we have a pretty fair description of the situation there now.
In fact this conference is being held at a critical time in the progress of the war in Afghanistan. Internally, the conflict with the Taliban has intensified in recent months. The recently concluded count for the country's presidential election with the findings of fraudulent voting, has served to underscore the deeply flawed character of Afghanistan's governance.
Externally, doubts about the costs of the conflict in both blood and treasure, are growing in the capitals of the members of International Security Afghanistan Force (ISAF) trying to end the Taliban insurgency. Prompted by General Mc Chrystal's force review, the Obama administration in the United States is undertaking yet another assessment of its Afghanistan strategy. It is doing so, only months after having settled on a new strategic course as a result of the Reidel review.
As so often in this conflict, we are at yet another point of decision, one of immense importance to Afghanistan's future. And not just to Afghanistan's future. The point that requires emphasis, and is rather too often overlooked in this conflict, is that its outcome will almost certainly have a profound impact on the future stability of the whole Southwest Asia region.
As we assess the situation in Afghanistan we need to embrace wider strategic horizons and appreciate that for as long as there is conflict and instability in Afghanistan, it will affect the survivability of a secular, more or less democratic Pakistan. State collapse in Pakistan would be a catastrophic setback in the fight against Islamic extremism and in the quest for regional stability. This is something that Australia, like very other ISAF country engaged in Afghanistan, should be determined to avoid.
The stakes in Afghanistan are therefore very high. They demand that we do not easily or effortlessly give up on its future stability free from Taliban rule.
As almost all analysts agree, this will be no easy task. The military, political and indeed economic challenges to be overcome are formidable. They very obviously demand a long term commitment by all those who have a strategic interest in the outcome. This certainly includes Australia and is the reason the Opposition supports the Rudd Government's commitment to Afghanistan.
However, it is with alarm that I sense increasing reluctance in the Government’s policy. The Rudd Government has always been a rather unenthusiastic advocate of our Afghanistan commitment: its arguments in support of our effort are formal and made with little conviction, and it seems to take every opportunity to emphasise the limits to Australian policy rather than the importance of prevailing in the conflict. As casualties have mounted, this state of affairs is only exacerbated as it becomes ever clearer that the Government’s support for the war in Afghanistan vacillates in tune with public opinion. While I feel encouraged by the comments Senator Faulkner made last week with regards to Australia’s long term presence in Afghanistan, I want to stress how important it is that the Government follows through on their operational consequences.
Australia's Interests
Australia has long term strategic interests in the future stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Perhaps the strategic imperatives are not as compelling as those of the United States or those of their immediate regional neighbours, but they are sufficiently compelling to justify a substantial investment in their future.
The origins of these interests can be found in Australia's membership of international coalition that intervened to bring down the Taliban and liberate the country from its repressive medieval rule in Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001. Given this role, it might be contended that the foundation of Australia's continuing interests in Afghanistan is a moral commitment to ensuring that the Taliban does not return to power there.
This is not the strongest argument for Australia's contemporary role. There are several more compelling strategic interests underpinning Australia's commitment. The first is to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a 'safe haven' for terrorism. Much of the public discussion over the conflict focuses on this issue. Some analysts are inclined to dismiss the strategic importance of this interest, but I consider it a critical issue. Certainly al Qaeda's base of operations appears to have shifted to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, but the significant, dangerous and continuing linkages between the Taliban and al Qaeda are not in doubt. They are a persistent threat to Afghanistan's stability and western interests in the region. The insurgents' freedom to move across a porous international border confronts ISAF with one of its greatest strategic challenges in trying to eliminate their presence. We would be taking a massive strategic risk if ISAF were to leave Afghanistan without a high degree of confidence that al Qaeda's alliance with elements of the Taliban had not been crushed.
Second, and perhaps in the end of greater strategic significance, is the impact of chaos in Afghanistan on Pakistan's stability. Democratic governance in Pakistan is already at grave risk from an internal, strong and increasingly ambitious al Qaeda-backed terrorist movement. Its recent intensified attacks testify to a growing sense of self confidence and a brutal and bloody determination to destroy an already unstable political order. For reasons well understood, I am sure, by this audience, the collapse of Pakistan into the hands of al Qaeda would be a strategic disaster. The fall of a democracy, however imperfect, to terrorism would embolden extremism in Asia and elsewhere, to say nothing of the threat that would emerge if Pakistan's nuclear warheads fell into the hands of the terrorists.
The chaos and instability in Afghanistan only serves to fuel this risk. As the analyst Stephen Biddle has written in relation to the US, but it is an observation that applies to other western countries, including Australia, we all have an interest in preventing Afghanistan from aggravating Pakistan's internal problems and magnifying the danger of an al-Qaeda nuclear armed sanctuary there.
Third, Australia has a national interest in Afghanistan borne of its alliance with United States. For Canberra, being part of the ISAF coalition in Afghanistan is an exercise in alliance maintenance. It is an elemental part of the continuing security burden Australia assumed in the war against Islamic extremism after 9/11. It is not an open ended commitment to support US policy, but it is an obligation of alliance that Australia must take seriously. It could well serve to define the future character of the security relationship between our two countries. For this reason, the Rudd Government's heightened rhetoric placing apparent constraints on Australia's military contribution to what President Obama has called the 'war of necessity' in Afghanistan, is an alarming dimension of the Government’s approach to this issue.
Fourth and finally, Australia seeks a peaceful and stable Afghanistan free of Taliban rule because the conflict there has been one of the main reasons so many Afghanis have sought escape and risked all for asylum in other countries. As long as the conflict continues, it will serve as one of the 'push' factors undermining the integrity of Australia's border security regime and ultimately the credibility of its successful immigration policy. Remaining committed to the creation of a stable Afghan state is an important way of addressing this policy challenge at source.
The Strategic Situation
At the moment, the political and military situations in Afghanistan and Pakistan are hardly very encouraging. Among the many troubling signs of the deeply entrenched problems that plague the two countries, we can count systems of governance that are discredited, dysfunctional, corrupt and lacking in legitimacy, stepped up insurgent activity leading to high levels of insecurity, the steady decline and in some places, the complete collapse of economic activity. In Afghanistan, the disruption of aid and reconstruction projects, the loss of government services and amenities and among the populations of the countries contributing to ISAF, a growing restiveness at the alarming human and financial costs of the war, are all causes for concern. None of this offers much reason for great confidence in either country's future.
Yet, perhaps this is unnecessarily pessimistic. It may seem to be clutching at very weak and short straws, but in recent months there have been some signs that the deepening turmoil which was enveloping Afghanistan and Pakistan during the first half of 2009 is being arrested. In some cases these developments have served to highlight the critical importance of using well established state institutions that retain legitimacy, as a way of fighting the insurgents.
Accordingly, while both countries are facing a crisis of governance, in Pakistan, the Army has always retained its legitimacy and is now on the offensive against the insurgents and achieving some successes. Only a matter of months ago it seemed unable to recognise the threat they posed to the Pakistan body politic. In Afghanistan, for all the taint of corruption and incompetence that surrounds the central government in Kabul, traditionally it has never been the key to the country's sense of itself. Government has always been stronger in the provinces and these are now becoming a critical element in all of the programs that form part of the enhanced counterinsurgency strategy.
When we look at the Afghanistan conflict we should also remember that the Taliban is not a movement with a widespread following or deep seated historical legitimacy within Afghan society. It may have managed to secure government in the late 1990s, but it is now a highly factionalised entity, deeply hated across some parts of the country and only tolerated in others. This helps to explain why ISAF forces, unlike those of the Soviet Union after 1978, are generally not viewed by most Afghanis as invaders. In 2001, the US coalition delivered Afghanis from a deeply unpopular, repressive regime, and most do not wish to return to it.
Against this background, there are other signs that offer reason to hope that all not is not lost in Afghanistan: the decision to hold a run-off presidential election after the embarrassment of the August ballot; a greater focus on the training of Afghan police and security forces and a re-energising of NATO's commitment following the appointment of a new Secretary-General and in the wake of the recent Bratislava conference.
What is to be done?
That said, what can be done in Afghanistan and in Pakistan for that matter, to build a sustainable momentum towards ending the conflicts? An answer to this question must begin by recognising that the capacity of outsiders to influence the direction of events is considerably more limited in Pakistan than Afghanistan. As the reaction to the offer by the US of a new aid package testifies, in Pakistan there is considerable cynicism about the motives of outsiders and a more acute instinct towards protection of its sovereignty.
In Afghanistan four broad options define the strategic possibilities. The first is to accept the impossibility of success and withdraw. This would hand victory to the Taliban, mean the reimposition of its medieval values on Afghanistan and signal a major defeat in the struggle against al Qaeda. Even in war adverse Europe, this option is widely disparaged. Despite the souring taste of the war among ISAF governments and publics alike, thoughts of walking away, at least is this stage, are considered premature.
Second, there is the steady state option. This would require, among other things, the maintenance of existing force levels with a focus on achieving greater security for the population, the continued delivery of considerable civilian aid and persistence with police and army training programs. It would probably also require negotiations with the Taliban sooner rather than later. This option would be unlikely to lead to much progress towards stability, certainly not rapid progress, and would probably be a recipe for prolonged military and political pain for both the Afghan people and the forces of the ISAF coalition.
Third, there is what is being called the Biden strategy. This requires a continuation of the present force deployment with a wind back over time, but accompanied by a fresh strategy - as Henry Kissinger said recently, 'shrink the mission.' It would mean trying to separate al Qaeda from its Taliban allies and involve a move away from a counterinsurgency strategy to a counter- terror strategy. While this approach might appear to focus on the 'real' enemy, at least of the ISAF, if not necessarily the Afghan people, the practicality of easily disentangling the elements of the insurgents would confront commanders with great challenges. As a strategy, it is probably not viable.
Finally, there is the option of sustaining the revitalised counterinsurgency strategy put in place by the Obama administration earlier in the year, but with the addition of a troop surge. This would enable increased offensive operations, the securing and holding of more ground and the stepping up of the training of Afghan forces. This is the essence of the proposal contained in General Mc Chrystal's report currently under consideration in Washington.
Choosing from among these or any other options is hardly an easy task. For all of the government’s currently commitment to the conflict in Afghanistan, it demands some complex calculations of risk and success set against such things as the availability and sustainability of forces, the capacity to deliver aid assistance and training and not least, the tolerance of public opinion for the loss of blood and treasure that will surely be demanded the longer the conflict continues.
A key consideration must also be the aims and objectives that governments set themselves in Afghanistan. For too long these were both too vague and unclear to provide the foundations for a credible strategic approach or too ambitious to be achievable, at least within a realistic timeframe. The reality is that we do not need a perfect Afghanistan, we just need one that is stable enough to meet the essential political economic and social needs of its people and free of enough Taliban influence to ensure that terrorism does not regain a foothold.
How do we get there?
The key to achieving these goals lies in a two-pronged approach, one that first focuses on internal change, and a second that concentrates on drawing Afghanistan's neighbours into making a diplomatic commitment to its long term future. In brief, the first requires a rebalancing of the relationship between the central government in Kabul and the governments in the provinces. At present the weight of power is probably too heavily in favour of the former. Equally, as Clare Lockhart has argued, there needs to be an emphasis on delivering security to the people, the building of viable institutions of policy making, a vastly improved system of public finance and creating the capacity to deliver better services – health, education, transport, water and the like.
The use of diplomacy as a tool to help bring stability to Afghanistan (and Pakistan) is now being canvassed widely in the much of the public discussion on the future of the region. Various permutations of interested parties are being discussed – a small contact group, for example. Possible venues, or sponsoring agencies – the UN, for instance, are also being suggested. Given the situations that exist on the ground in both Afghanistan and Pakistan at the moment, it seems premature, to say the least, to contemplate diplomacy playing a significant role in bringing an end to the conflicts and delivering the internal stability that is required. (Regional diplomacy had its advocates in Iraq, but that too proved unviable.)
Eventually, however, diplomacy could have a role in providing the assurances that both Pakistan and Afghanistan would value in relation to their territorial integrity and denying their soil to the promoters of terrorism around the world. The US would doubtless need to lead such as initiative in conjunction with other NATO allies, but also likely to have a part to play would be Russia, India, China, Saudi Arabia and Iran. No one could doubt the complex challenge of any international negotiation involving this group of states or even a smaller combination of a few. But the reality that might just make diplomacy possible in Southwest Asia is that the insurgents command little international support and are widely viewed as destabilising a region where great and regional power interests have always been delicately poised.
Australian policy
Compared to some other countries with forces in Afghanistan, the US, Canada and Britain for instance, the Afghan conflict has not been a particularly salient issue in Australian politics. As casualties have begun to mount however, it has been drawing greater attention and public opinion has begun to shift more decisively against Australia's continuing participation. The inattention has no doubt suited the Rudd Government. Afghanistan is after all, a commitment inherited from its predecessor and not one over which it seems keen to claim ownership. More importantly, the low visibility of the war has allowed the Prime Minister free to concentrate on his more cherished international objectives, and leave much of the day to day management of the Australian role to his Defence Minister. The Rudd government is reluctant to champion Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan, not withstanding that it is the only theatre of defence operations where Australian defence force personnel are at high risk of dying or being severely wounded. The cause for which these brave men and women are making the ultimate sacrifice deserves a committed champion, and that, at the very least should be the Australian Government.
It is doubtful whether Afghanistan can long remain in the more remote reaches of the Australian consciousness. It is also doubtful whether the Government can continue to enjoy the indulgence of not having to concentrate on the stark realities of the war.
In the short term, two specific events will likely concentrate the Rudd government's mind. One will be the Obama Administration's completion of its evaluation of on General Mc Chrystal’s request for more forces. This could well be several weeks away. The second event of which the government already has notice, is the Netherlands intention to withdraw its forces from Oruzgan province- where Australia's forces are deployed, in August next year. The Dutch forces are critical to the conduct of Australia's security operations in Oruzgan and their departure will leave a large gap in ISAF capability there.
What to do?
The results of the McChrystal Review and the pending departure of the Dutch forces from the Oruzgan province, where our forces are deployed, should already be forcing some hard headed thinking about the nature of Australia’s continued commitment to Afghanistan. The policy choices available to the Government are as wide ranging as they are complex and no one should think there can be any easy decisions.
First, once the McChrystal Review is completed, Australia should conduct its own comprehensive review of its Afghanistan policy. It should be a whole of Government exercise, drawing-in all of the agencies with interests in Afghanistan, and should identify policy initiatives that strongly support and reinforce the strategic objectives of the US and its NATO allies there. If further troop contributions are called for, the Australian Government should give serious consideration to the matter. It should not pre-emptively rule out an increase as it is now seems to be doing.
Second, once the review is completed and our commitments have been decided, the government should step-up its efforts to sell the policy. At the moment the government is a reluctant advocate of our Afghanistan commitment. Its arguments in support of our effort are formal and made without conviction and it seems to take every opportunity to emphasize the limits to Australian policy rather than the importance of prevailing in the conflict.
The strategic rationale for Australia's involvement ion Afghanistan needs to be spelled out more clearly, the case made with greater conviction. The Australian people need to know, and deserve to know what is at stake. The government needs to go onto the offensive in seeking to arrest the steady decline in public support for war. As it stands, the Rudd Government’s hesitation to take ownership of this conflict necessarily means that it cannot expect to sustain the public support for a war which has already killed and wounded so many brave Australians.
Third, if 'creative middle power diplomacy' actually means anything, the government should use it diplomatic energies to explore the diplomatic route to assisting a settlement in Afghanistan. Regionally, a more urgent, but very demanding, task exists in trying to bring about some accommodation of the differences between Pakistan and India. These differences are helping to frustrate efforts to confront effectively the insurgencies in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Saving Afghanistan is worth considerable political, economic and military effort on the part of the countries of the ISAF coalition. Australia itself has obvious strategic interests there which the Australia government should be determined to protect. Arguing, as it is often inclined to do, that Afghanistan is NATO's problem and we can or should be, only a subsidiary player in the conflict may serve the Rudd Government's domestic political agenda, but it is highly dubious strategic policy. As President Obama has remarked in relation to America's commitment Afghanistan, 'you don't muddle through the central front on terror.' Nor should Australia.